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TRESPASS TO CULTURE: THE BIOETHICS OF
INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS’ INFORMED CONSENT IN
MAINSTREAM GENETIC RESEARCH PARADIGMS
Alexandra Winters *
I. Introduction
Today, genetic research is considered of vital importance in the fight
against many diseases. 1 Researchers use genes to study diseases such as
diabetes, asthma, and leukemia. 2 The indigenous populations of the world
are often identified as ideal sample populations for these studies because of
their isolation and the effect that isolation has on their genetic structure.3
The benefits of this research are significant, but new questions have arisen
regarding the rights of DNA donors, particularly in light of the case of
Henrietta Lacks and her HeLa cells, which were harvested without her
knowledge or consent and are now mass produced—an “immortal cell
line”. 4
Such questions are difficult at the best of times, but doubly so in the case
of indigenous participants. 5 Standard frameworks of research and informed
consent in the United States were not designed to accommodate indigenous
* First-place winner, 2015-2016 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
J.D., 2016, University of Dayton School of Law; M.S.W., 2014, Ohio University; B.A.,
2012, Miami University of Oxford.
1. See Charles Weijer & James A. Anderson, A Critical Appraisal of Protections for
Aboriginal Communities in Biomedical Research, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 187, 187 (2002); see
also Bette Jacobs, Jason Roffenbender, Jeff Collmann, Kate Cherry, LeManuel L. Bitsoi,
Kim Bassett & Charles H. Evans, Jr., Bridging the Divide Between Genomic Science and
Indigenous Peoples, 38 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 684, 684 (2010) (discussing the history of
biomedical research among indigenous populations).
2. See Weijer & Anderson, supra note 1, at 187.
3. See Charles Pensabene, A Canyon Full of Woes: The Havasupai Tribe Illustrates the
Need for Cultural Competency in Genetic Research, 7 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 637, 649-50
(2014).
4. See Joan L. McGregor, Genome Justice: Genetics and Group Rights: Population
Genomics and Research Ethics with Socially Identifiable Groups, 35 J. L., MED. & ETHICS
356, 356-57 (2007); see also Deleso A. Alford, HeLa Cells and Unjust Enrichment in the
Human Body, 21 ANN. HEALTH L. 223, 223-36 (2012) (discussing unjust enrichment and
debated property rights in the body).
5. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus primarily on the difficulties faced by the
Native American tribes of the United States, but I will use the term “indigenous” to include
both Native Americans and international native populations.
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peoples, and as a result, the field of bioethics has so far allowed their cases
to slip through the cracks.6 In the United States, the history of oppression
that has followed the Native American tribes has now been compounded
with instances of misuse of tribal DNA donated for research. 7 If
researchers’ goal is to continue genetic research in the pursuit of improved
medical knowledge, the alienation of potential allies is a flawed approach.
This paper discusses bioethics as applied to indigenous communities and
advocates for culturally competent informed consent procedures in genetic
research. Section II will discuss the field of bioethics and the foundation for
the current system. Section III will focus on relevant examples of failed
informed consent with indigenous tribes. Section IV will address tribal
sovereignty as the foundation for future paradigms of informed consent.
Section V provides suggested methods for correcting the deficiencies in the
current informed consent procedures by applying principles of tribal
sovereignty.
II. Background
Bioethics, specifically informed consent, has its modern origins in the
Belmont Report. 8 The Nuremburg Code, stemming from principles stated in
the Hippocratic Oath, was developed in response to the human
experimentation performed under the Nazi regime in World War II. 9 The
Code provides fundamental rights to research subjects and requires
voluntary consent from the subjects, as well as the subjects’ ability to
choose freely whether or not to participate in research.10 The Code also
calls for details of potential risks and benefits, avoiding unnecessary pain

6. See McGregor, supra note 4, at 361; see also Weijer & Anderson, supra note 1, at
188.
7. See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008).
8. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 646.
9. See Adam H. Laughton, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?: International
Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 181, 183-84
(2007).
10. See McGregor, supra note 4, at 360 (“The Code states subjects ‘should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved so
he can make an informed and enlightened decision.’”); see also Laughton, supra note 9, at
192 (“[T]he Common Rule requires that researchers secure the informed consent of the
subject by providing subjects with a statements that the study involves research, the
purpose(s) of the research, and the procedure(s) involved in the research.”).
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and suffering, qualified researchers, and the ability to withdraw from the
project whenever the participant chooses. 11
The Belmont Report was released in 197912 after the Tuskegee study
scandal. The Report was premised on researcher respect when designing a
project concerning genetic research. 13 The foundation of respect led to the
formation of the “Common Rule.” 14 The Common Rule demands informed
consent from research participants through statements that specify that the
study involves research, identifies the purpose of the research, and details
any risks or benefits. 15
The participants are also supposed to be provided with a statement of
confidentiality, information about how any records are made during the
course of the research, and information regarding means of identifying the
participant. 16 The researcher is obligated to inform the participants of any
significant findings that may bear on the participants’ willingness to
continue in the study. 17 Despite these protections, the Common Rule was
only designed to protect living human beings, not any genetic materials that
have been separated from their hosts. 18
A. The Traditional Approach Under Moore
The question of protecting genetic materials has now created much
discussion. Debate arose in light of Moore v. Regents of the University of
California 19 as many states follow the rule of law established in that case,
while the rest adopt the genetic research approach that supports the
principles developed in both the Nuremburg Code and the Belmont Report.
While this debate continues, it is undeniable that the majority of states
follow Moore. Although approaches to donor rights over their DNA are
slowly changing, the traditional perspective in mainstream research
11. See McGregor, supra note 4, at 360.
12. See Laughton, supra note 9, at 187.
13. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 646.
14. Id. at 646-47.
15. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 647; see also Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Lessons from
Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona State University Board of Regents: Recognizing Group,
Cultural, and Dignitary Harms as Legitimate Risks Warranting Integration into Research
Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 175, 198 (2010) (discussing the collection
framework for human biological materials).
16. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 647.
17. Id.
18. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 199.
19. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 936 (1991).
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assumes that donors have no property rights over genetic materials given
for research. 20 No rights signifies no compensation and no recognition. 21 In
fact, it is all too easy to ignore the DNA contribution altogether, leaving
pharmaceutical companies and research firms to pocket the revenues, the
respect, and the limelight.
In Moore, the plaintiff (John Moore) was diagnosed with hairy-cell
leukemia and in the course of treatment had his spleen removed. 22
Following his surgery, researchers used his diseased spleen to create and
patent a cell line without his consent.23 Outraged, Moore claimed he never
gave permission for his tissues to be used in this fashion and believed that
the researchers had deceived him in his treatment so they could gain
financially. 24
The California Supreme Court, however, disagreed that Moore had a
property interest in his tissues and held that recognizing such interests
would stint medical progress. 25 Consequently, Moore has become the
dominant legal standard regarding ownership of genetic materials,26
solidifying that intellectual property law supports the practice of denying
donor ownership and patent rights.
It is also noteworthy that the court held that the researchers had not
obtained informed consent and they should have disclosed their plans for
financial gain through use of Moore’s tissues. 27 Others have called for
better communication, including informed consent agreements with donors,
so that donors understand how their materials will be used and what their
rights are at all stages. 28 Such a practice would be consistent with the
mandates of the Nuremberg Code and the Belmont Report.29
20. See Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors?, 45
JURIMETRICS J. 153, 155 (2005).
21. See id.
22. Moore, 51 Cal. at 124-27; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 156.
23. Moore, 51 Cal. at 124-27; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 156.
24. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990); see also
Marchant, supra note 20, at 157.
25. Moore, 51 Cal. at 146-47; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 157.
26. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 157.
.nd.chase price he had already parm?uation
, Ernie is entitled to the value he put in into the land.chase price he had already p
27.
Moore, 51 Cal. at 148; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 157 (“The court did . . . hold in
favor of Moore that he had plead a valid cause of action on his alternative claim that the
researchers failed to obtain adequate informed consent . . . by not disclosing their potential
financial interest in Moore’s cells.”).
28. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 163 (“Genetic researchers will hopefully . . .
provide better communication and express agreements with DNA donors about how their
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Informed consent is comprised of both individual self-determination and
respect. 30 In terms of human research and participants, informed consent
occurs “when it is given by a person who understands the purpose and
nature of the study, what participation in the study requires the person to do
and to risk, and what benefits are intended to result from the study.” 31 This
definition, however widely recognized, does not adequately address
indigenous populations 32 because it takes an individualistic approach,
whereas many indigenous cultures operate on a community-based
approach. 33
B. The Property Rights Approach
The traditional paradigm of genetic ownership is slowly changing and
proponents of donor rights in a growing number of jurisdictions have made
some headway in gaining recognition. The Human Genome Diversity
Project, for example, acknowledges and supports a duty to share benefits
with DNA donors. 34 The Human Genome Organization has also adopted a
“Statement on Benefit-Sharing” which advocates for sharing benefits of
research with the research participants.35
Certain states, such as Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Alaska, and
Louisiana, have enacted laws that define genetic information as personal
property. 36 In those states, a plaintiff can file a conversion claim because
their genetic material would be considered personal property, whereas John
Moore was barred from a conversion claim because the Court ruled he had
no ownership right in his genetic materials.37

genetic material will be used in research, including any potential plans to claim intellectual
property rights.”).
29. See discussion supra Part II.
30. See Constance MacIntosh, Indigenous Self-Determination and Research on Human
Genetic Material: A Consideration of the Relevance of Debates on Patents and Informed
Consent, and the Political Demands on Researchers, 13 HEALTH L.J. 213, 236 (2005).
31. Id. (quoting 1991 International Guidelines for Ethical Review of Epidemiological
Studies, COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCI., http://www.cioms.ch/publications/guide
lines/1991_texts_of_guidelines.htm).
32. See MacIntosh, supra note 30, at 236.
33. See id.; see also Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 209.
34. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 159.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 160-61; see also Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/genetic-privacy-laws.aspx (last visited
June 24, 2015).
37. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 136-37 (Cal. 1990).
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The clash between the traditional individual approach and the property
rights approach has always been about donor rights versus scientific
progress, and the “blind promotion of scientific research.”38 As mentioned
above, genetic research has become incredibly important in the fight against
certain diseases, but restrictions on scientific development are prevalent. 39
Budgets are limited, as is time, and it is understandable that further
restrictions are a frustration to researchers.40 Some researchers argue that
diverting limited funds to compensate DNA donors would be yet another
restriction. 41
Unfortunate as delays may be, they are necessary because they conform
to the Nuremberg Code and the Belmont Report by ensuring both
participants’ fundamental rights and that voluntary consent stems from a
thorough understanding of the research. 42 DNA donors should be able to
understand why researchers, companies, and educational institutions need
their tissues and why it is going to grant those researchers and companies so
much money. As researchers argue, it is true that donors will share the
benefits of any discoveries made, but they also bear a significant risk for
invasion of privacy and misuse of their DNA. 43
Proponents of a property rights approach note that if DNA were
considered property, donors could pursue redress under the tort of
conversion since a researcher’s use of the genetic material could be
inconsistent with the owner’s property rights.44 The threat of a tort would
provide an incentive for a more collaborative approach with donors, and in
the case of indigenous populations, would provide some protection for their
cultural beliefs and practices. 45 One scholar, however, believes that a more
effective means of achieving that goal is through a culturally competent
informed consent process. 46 The informed consent process, he states, allows
for contractual remedies that would protect the donor’s interests.47
38. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 210; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 166.
39. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 166.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See discussion supra Part II.
43. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 166; see also Pensabene, supra note 3, at 642
(“Providing human subjects with adequate protections is crucial because genetic material
contains the most personal date regarding an individual’s physical identity.”); Drabiak-Syed,
supra note 15, at 216.
44. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 642-44.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 647.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss1/8

No. 1]

SPECIAL FEATURES

237

III. Informed Consent Among Indigenous Populations
When it comes to many indigenous populations, the problem with the
individual approach is that it emphasizes a split of the biological material
from the person as soon as it is removed and therefore gives the person no
rights in the now separate material. 48 That separation often affects
indigenous populations’ rights over something that they still consider to be
part of themselves, even if it is no longer technically part of their body. 49 In
the end, then, this separation is a form of alienation of both the self and the
community because it takes a part of their very essence away from them
with no regard for how such an action can impact their sense of personal
and communal completeness.50 Perhaps a better definition of informed
consent is one recognizing that cultural sensitivity is an important piece of
the cultural competency aspect of informed consent.
Fergus MacKay, Senior Counsel for the Legal and Human Rights
Programme at the Forest Peoples’ Programme, suggests defining “informed
consent” as “the consensus/consent of indigenous people determined in
accordance with their customary laws and practices.”51
MacKay’s definition might help address misuse of indigenous genetic
materials, a problem that is neither insignificant nor localized. Misuse has
happened throughout the world, particularly in the area of patents that
includes the mapping of populations’ genomes around the world. 52 Native
American tribes have also been affected domestically, which culminated in
the widely debated Havasupai decision. 53 This decision illustrates the lack
of informed consent applied to indigenous research participants and the
cultural misunderstandings behind it.
A. Pre-Havasupai Cases
In 1958, the federal government devoted significant energy to the field
of genetics in its effort to advance atomic research during the Cold War,
and considered Native Americans ideal research subjects.54 “Project
48. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 221.
49. See id. at 221-22.
50. See id. at 224.
51. Fergus MacKay, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent
and the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 43, 49
(2004) (discussing the meaning of free, prior informed consent).
52. See Jacobs et al., supra note 1, at 684.
53. See Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
54. See Ron J. Whitener, Research in Native American Communities in the Genetics
Age: Can the Federal Data Sharing Statute of General Applicability and Tribal Control of
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Chariot” was designed to create a seaport near the Inupiat town of Point
Hope, Alaska. 55 The United States government engaged in environmental
experiments with radiation by releasing radioactive substances near the
town. 56 The purpose was to see how the indigenous population reacted to
the radiation; specifically, to see if they had genetically higher metabolisms
that would help them in adverse weather conditions.57 The Inupiat,
however, were not told about the study, did not give consent, and did not
find out about the research until 1992. 58
The case of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth of British Columbia is also worth
noting. There, indigenous participants gave blood samples to a researcher
so that he could study rheumatoid arthritis.59 The researcher moved to the
University of Utah and then to Oxford University, taking the blood samples
with him. 60 He then used the blood samples for his own purposes and
loaned them out to other researchers—none of which was addressed in the
informed consent agreements that the indigenous participants signed. 61
“When the Nuu-Chah-Nulth discovered” what had happened, “they
demanded” the return of their samples, but the tribe did not look favorably
on genetic research again. 62 Canada later revised its policy concerning
informed consent for future uses of data samples. 63
A similar situation occurred in Papua New Guinea, where a cell line
from a Hagahai man was patented in the United States. 64 The Hagahai were
in the middle of a malaria outbreak and sought medical assistance from an
anthropologist, who collected extensive data including blood samples.65
The blood samples showed that the Hagahai carried a benign T-cell
leukemia lymphoma virus. 66 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued
the patent to the American government three years later.67 In response to
Research Be Reconciled?, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 217, 229 (2010) (noting research abuses
among Native American and Alaskan Native communities).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 229-30.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 234-35.
60. See id. at 235.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See MacIntosh, supra note 30, at 227.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 228.
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the public outcry that followed, the National Health Institute claimed that
the patent had met all the requirements and that the Hagahai did not own
their donated materials.68
There was a similar case in Panama, where the National Health Institute
filed a patent application for a T-cell line developed from a Guaymi
woman. 69 U.S. officials claimed that the woman had given her consent to
the taking of her DNA. 70 However, the question is not whether she gave
consent, but whether she gave informed consent, because consent without a
full understanding and disclosure of what she consented to in that research
is not truly informed consent. The international condemnation led to the
withdrawal of the patent application.71 Nevertheless, the DNA was not
returned to its people. 72
The Guaymi woman’s case, and many others, establish that there is a
significant history of misuse when it comes to indigenous populations’
genetic materials. Most of these cases appear to have gone relatively
unnoticed, as did the misuse, until the Havasupai brought it to public
attention.
B. The Havasupai Decision
A leading complaint in the lack of indigenous populations’ informed
consent is the issue of stigma. 73 Genetic research places tribal DNA under
close scrutiny, and anything found has the power to reflect on tribal
populations themselves. 74 This stigma is highly pertinent for Native
American tribes when considered in the context of their long history of
discrimination. 75 Native Americans may not view blood the same way as
our research or patent systems do. Many consider blood to be “a sacred link
to the tribe’s ancestors that retains its sacred status well after removal from
the body.” 76
68. See id.
69. See Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global Debate on
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law and
Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 32 (2004) (discussing patent dilemmas in indigenous
populations’ genetic materials).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 32-33.
72. See id. at 33.
73. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 650.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 653.
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In effect, blood and DNA contain the very essence of the tribe. 77
Mishandling and misusing it is a disruption to more than just one person—it
is a disruption to the entire community and its spiritual well-being. 78
Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents 79 is the best illustration of
the disruption misuse can have. The case probably demonstrates the most
famous example of failed informed consent within an indigenous
population. There, the Havasupai tribe gave blood samples voluntarily to
Arizona State University (ASU), but specified that the samples were only to
be used for research on diabetes. 80 They later discovered that ASU
researchers also used the samples in studies on “schizophrenia, inbreeding,
and theories about ancient-human population migrations . . . .” 81 This last
area of study is particularly offensive to the Havasupai because they believe
that their people came from the Grand Canyon. 82 The Havasupai claimed
that the University had broken its vow of confidentiality and had given their
private genetic information to third parties, including more than one
doctoral candidate for their dissertations. 83
Havasupai warrants further investigation of the informed consent
process involved. The Tribal Council received a letter from the lead
researcher that described the project as relating to diabetes and that purpose
was emphasized in person as well. 84 When the researchers began to take
blood samples, they again explained that the purpose of the project was to
study diabetes. 85 They also provided consent forms to the participants, and
the participants all indicated that they understood, but what they signed
identified the purpose of the research as “to study the causes of
behavioral/medical disorders.” 86 Behavioral disorders were not mentioned
orally, but those forms initiated the unauthorized use of the samples for
purposes other than diabetes. 87 Furthermore, the Havasupai must have
believed that the samples would be returned to them because, given their
beliefs about genetic material and its connection to themselves, they would
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 213.
See id. at 214.
204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
See Havasupai v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
See id. at 1067.
See id.
See id. at 1067-68.
See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 180.
See id.
Id. (quoting STEPHEN HART, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT CONCERNING THE MEDICAL
GENETICS PROJECT AT HAVASUPAI, app. A at 23 (2003)).
87. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 181.
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not have agreed to part with it otherwise. Yet no evidence supports that the
topic of their return was raised—probably because neither party thought it
was necessary. The misunderstanding on that one topic alone further
affirms the need for culturally competent informed consent.
When the project was handed over to another researcher, he did not
know that written consent was needed and followed only an oral consent
process. 88 There, too, he identified the purpose as a study focusing only on
diabetes. 89 Other discrepancies in the research process have come to light as
well. As it happened, another researcher who was interested in
schizophrenia began to study the blood samples for that purpose, and began
collecting samples from the tribe a full summer before the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approved a project on schizophrenia.90
A key piece of informed consent is that it is obtained in advance of
official authorization.91 This timeframe assures that the process also
provides indigenous participants enough time to consider the relevant
information and request more if needed. 92 Sometimes it will be necessary to
negotiate an agreement that is acceptable to both researchers and
participants, and give the indigenous population the right to participate as
they choose and obtain any information or advice that they require.93 That
process was bypassed here. Furthermore, the information was supposed to
be private, and the participants were assured that it would be—yet the
researcher provided open access to the samples to ASU and non-affiliated
researchers who were studying a myriad of topics. 94
In analyzing the district court’s decision against the plaintiff tribe,
Professor Katherine Drabiak-Syed claims that the court entirely failed to
consider what blood and genetic research mean to the Havasupai tribe. 95
She noted that while the tribal participants signed the consent as the court
concluded, the researcher defendants used fraudulent statements to get the
samples. 96

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 181-82.
See MacKay, supra note 51, at 56.
See id.
See id. at 57.
Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 183.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 188.
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The court did place a significant amount of weight on that consent, but
the question is whether it was informed consent. 97 The researchers did not
communicate to the participants the full extent of what would be done with
their samples, and so the participants did not have the information they
needed to give consent. 98 They would likely not have consented to the
complete disregard of tribal privacy rights that came from sharing the
samples with third parties.
The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement, which included
damages and the return of the blood samples and all related documents.99
The University enacted some changes to its IRB samples as well, including
consideration of ongoing research that uses blood samples, and they now
provide a list to the tribe of anyone who received their samples. 100
C. Cultural Misunderstandings
It is telling to examine the researchers’ reactions to the Havasupai
controversy. In interviews with one of the researchers, the tribe was
described as “hysterical” in the face of “doing good science.” 101
Recognition for indigenous beliefs is conspicuously absent in those
comments—as is respect. Many indigenous populations simply do not hold
their blood and genetic information as items of scientific value, but rather
as part of themselves and their people. 102 The Havasupai case and medical
researchers’ initial reaction to it have brought to light the need for a revised
framework.
Secondary research—when biological materials are used subsequent to
the primary research—is a particular problem in current informed consent
procedures. 103 IRBs do not assess harm if the information collected is
private and provides no opportunity to match the data to its donor. 104 If the
samples are completely anonymized the secondary research on them does

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 195.
See id.
Id. at 196 (quoting Howard Fischer, Havasupai Blood Lawsuit Reinstated, ARIZ.
DAILY SUN (Nov. 28, 2008), http://azdailysun.com/news/havasupai-blood-lawsuit-reinstated/
article_2921c286-4454-57eb-926b-11e795134f8f.html; David Usborne, Blood Feud in the
Grand Canyon, INDEPENDENT (London) (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/blood-feud-in-the-grand-canyon-1951972.html).
102. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 196.
103. Id. at 199.
104. Id. at 200.
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not violate current human genetic research standards, which occurred with
the Havasupai. 105
The data is at risk of being identifiable because researchers can make
sweeping generalizations about a population based on those samples that
affect an entire tribe.106 For example, the researcher in Havasupai claimed
that the samples were anonymized, but she did label them all with the prefix
“HAV”—which effectively identified the Havasupai tribe. 107 Even when
identifiers are removed, participants can still feel stigmatization and
spiritual harm because their genetic material can still be used to attribute
characteristics or genetic history to their the tribe as a whole, even without a
personal identifier, and that affects more than just the individual
participant.108
There is also an inherent problem when a participant is denied the right
to discontinue participation in research. When the Havasupai realized their
DNA was being misused, they sought to withdraw from the study and were
denied that right. 109
Such a denial can have lasting effects to the tribal culture. Cultural harm
is such a significant lasting effect, and to indigenous populations, the risks
of harm include any practice that “disparage[s] their spiritual traditions,
historical narratives, or traditional beliefs.” 110 It is possible that researchers
and IRBs omitted a concern for cultural harm because it is not a harm they
themselves would conceptualize as real.111
For example, researchers from a university might not hold a communitycentered view of property as do many indigenous populations. Indigenous
views of property may not be individual-centered, as American law
favors. 112 Moreover, indigenous property systems may contain specific
105. Id.
106. See id. at 202.
107. Id. at 203.
108. See id. at 207; see also Richard R. Sharp & Morris W. Foster, An Analysis of
Research Guidelines on the Collection and Use of Human Biological Materials from
American Indian and Alaskan Native Communities, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 165, 167 (2002)
(discussing the pros and cons of research for social groups).
105a. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 207.
109. Id. at 206.
110. McGregor, supra note 4, at 363.
111. See id.
112. See Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American
Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 396, 397-98
(2007); see also Debra Harry & Le’a Malia Kanehe, Asserting Tribal Sovereignty over
Cultural Property: Moving Towards Protection of Genetic Material and Indigenous
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perspectives about resources that have a sacred spirituality. 113 Indigenous
populations often have a different view of the relationship between human
beings and the environment, which differs from the Western system of
property that asserts individual rights and actions against other
individuals. 114
Indigenous populations also tend to have a communal approach of family
and social ties in their property frameworks. 115 Cultural harm is considered
a direct attack on cultural survival. 116 That harm is impermissible because
“Native peoples have political and cultural rights in association with their
distinctive status and relationship with their traditional lands.”117 It goes
without saying that indigenous peoples also have the right to preserve that
relationship from harm. 118
Indigenous populations frequently consider themselves shepherds of the
land and responsible for various spiritual duties. 119 Their duties include
responsibilities to their “cultural property,” which has been defined as
“‘everything that belongs to the distinct identity of a people,’ which
‘includes inheritances from the past and from nature, such as human
remains, the natural features of the landscape, and naturally-occurring
species of plants and animals with which a people has long been
connected.’” 120
Harming that knowledge or way of life has lasting consequences on their
cultural survival; cultural harm and concepts of “sacred,” however, have not
been considered a viable basis for damages in American courts.121 Indeed,
intellectual property paradigms are traditionally lacking in any
consideration of cultural harm, 122 and indigenous cultural property is not

Knowledge, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 27, 32 (2006) (addressing indigenous populations’
view of property ownership).
113. See Tsosie, supra note 112, at 398.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 402.
117. Id. at 403.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 404.
120. Harry & Kanehe, supra note 112, at 31.
121. See Tsosie, supra note 112, at 404; see also Mary Daniel, Tribal DNA: Does It
Exist, and Can It Be Protected?, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 431, 459-60 (2005) (discussing
the difficulty of using the patent system to protect tribal DNA).
122. See Tsosie, supra note 112, at 405.
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safe from misappropriation. 123 For these reasons, indigenous peoples are
often distrustful of biomedical research.124
This distrust was more than apparent in the Havasupai tribe. Havasupai
teachings say that all genetic and biological materials must be intact in
order for a tribal member to cross into the next world. 125 Imagine how it
affected the tribe when five Havasupais died from diabetes while the case
was being argued; 126 the tribe believed that those people could not cross
into the next world unless their blood samples were returned. 127 That belief
was not likely one that a non-Havasupai researcher considered, which
explains why the university researchers did not address it in their informed
consent procedure. Havasupai as well as the other aforementioned cases
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of both culturally competent
informed consent and many indigenous belief systems.
IV. Tribal Sovereignty in the Context of Informed Consent
The above concerns arise primarily because researchers do not take into
account the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. There are 566 federally
recognized tribes in the United States.128 The status of these tribes was
determined in three seminal cases: Johnson v. Macintosh, Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia. 129 In these cases, Chief Justice
Marshall established that tribes are separate, but dependent, nations, limited
only in their ability to convey land and transact with foreign
governments. 130 The state that hosts a tribal nation is not permitted to
interfere with tribal affairs in any other respect.131 In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, Justice Marshall relegated the tribes to “domestic dependent
nations”, but he also granted them some recognition as “states”.132
123. See Harry & Kanehe, supra note 112, at 27.
124. Tsosie, supra note 112, at 405. See generally Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (researchers’ use of tribal blood samples did
not match the uses authorized by donors in the university’s informed consent process).
125. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 214.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Federal and State Recognized Tribes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized-tribes.aspx
(last visited Aug. 17, 2016).
129. See WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 73-75 (6th ed.
2014).
130. See id. at 75.
131. See id.
132. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
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Even that recognition, however, soon began to fail. An additional
limitation on tribal sovereignty presented itself in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, where the Supreme Court held that tribes have no criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, basing its decision entirely on the domestic
dependent status of the tribes. 133 This case marked the beginning of the end
for any recognition as a state previously held by the tribes. The line of
judicial opinions following includes Montana v. United States, in which the
Court held that tribes do not have the power to regulate fish and wildlife on
their own reservations and which limited tribal jurisdiction to “internal
relations”. 134 In the end, the tribes have sovereignty at the discretion of
Congress, and the veneer of tribal sovereignty is quite thin in American
jurisprudence. 135
The veneer may be thin, but it exists nonetheless. Federal Indian policy
promotes government-to-government cooperation between tribal and
federal governments. 136 Any undertakings that could potentially affect tribal
rights or resources should be subjected to standards of tribal sovereignty
and respect. 137 Generally, the federal government and its departments are
expected to consult tribal authorities before taking any action that could
affect the tribes, assess the impact of any proposed programs or activities,
and present viable solutions to address the needs of the tribes. 138 Federal
agencies are also asked to encourage the tribes to design and implement
their own policies in order to maintain tribal authority and objectives.139
The question that has not been sufficiently addressed by either tribal or
American courts, in any framework, concerns tribal sovereignty over
intangible rights, like intellectual property rights in biotechnology. The
federal government’s policy, however, is consistent with accommodating
indigenous beliefs and needs in modern research paradigms. Many scholars,
including Professor Rebecca Tsosie and Professor Katherine Drabiak-Syed,
133. See 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978).
134. 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
135. See CANBY, supra note 129, at 88-89; see also White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d
1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing ownership of ancient remains under the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act).
136. See Colleen M. Diener, Natural Resources Management and Species Protection in
Indian Country: Alternatives to Imposing Federal and State Enforcement upon Tribal
Governments and Native Americans, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 211, 216 (2004) (reviewing the
federal-tribal relationship).
137. See id. at 217 (citing Government-to-Government Relations with Native American
Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994)).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 217-18.
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have discussed the disparity. Even though established principles of tribal
sovereignty specifically recognize independent tribal decision-making and
mandate consultation with the tribes for anything that might affect them—
such as their participation in biomedical research—culturally competent
informed consent remains unaddressed.
V. Obtaining Culturally Competent Informed Consent
Indeed, it would be difficult for anyone to argue that participation in
biomedical research and obtaining genetic information from an indigenous
population do not affect that population and/or that donor. Therefore, it is
difficult to deny the importance of informed consent since it protects
indigenous interests while minimizing harm. 140 Moreover, it provides
indigenous participants with a means of protecting their ability to realize
the benefits of the research project impacting them. 141
Unfortunately, obtaining informed consent in the first place can be
difficult because some risks cannot be accurately foreseen or described
even if they are known. 142 It is more difficult to predict intangible harms
that are particularly relevant to indigenous populations, such as dignitary
harms and cultural harms. 143 Several scholars have provided
recommendations that present sound opportunities for increasing cultural
awareness of informed consent with indigenous populations. The following
recommendations represent a basic synthesized framework of the most
plausible and effective recommendations from scholars such as Professors
Joan McGregor, Morris Foster, Bette Jacobs, Ron Whitener, and Debra
Harry, as well as from biomedical ethicist Richard Sharp and attorney Le’a
Malia Kanehe. What follows is the author’s interpretation of an effective
methodology for a culturally competent informed consent processes.
(1) Community Participation and Control. Progress requires cooperation,
and the best way to ensure community cooperation is to make them an
active part of the research.144 Community representatives, for example, are
much better suited to identify potential harms than an outsider to the
community would be. 145 This is a measure that takes cultural differences

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See MacKay, supra note 51, at 50.
See id.
See Sharp & Foster, supra note 108, at 171.
See id.
See McGregor, supra note 4, at 366.
See Sharp & Foster, supra note 108, at 174.
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into account and conveys respect for those differences by allowing
indigenous perspectives to be heard.146
Community participation will also make informed consent a more
holistically informed process. For instance, secondary research should be
addressed with the indigenous community members. If the research is
sought for renewal or a secondary purpose, indigenous consultation is
important. 147 Part of the informed consent process should also deal with
mechanisms for reporting findings to participants. 148 Certainly, participants
deserve to be kept up to date on the research that they are hoping will
benefit them. And certainly, the participants should be able to view the
findings and discuss possible dissemination to the public before the results
are actually disseminated to the public.149
Community participation and consent has the benefit of protecting
indigenous cultures and helping to ensure their survival. 150 It also has the
benefit of giving researchers a sure path to successful projects—after all,
indigenous populations know themselves and their communities better than
anyone else ever will, and their help and knowledge are vital to making
progress. 151
(2) Indigenous Institutional Review Boards and Research Codes.
Indigenous control and understanding of their resources is what makes
having their own IRBs important. Professor Ron Whitener argues that
indigenous peoples should create their own research systems and include
indigenous participation in them. 152 He notes that indigenous research codes
should assert a property right over the data collected, and therefore a right
to regulate how it is used. 153 Researchers seeking to work with indigenous
populations should also sign documents indicating that they understand the
data belongs to the participant community. 154
Currently, the U.S. Indian Health Service has its own IRBs for any
research that one of its facilities plans to undertake, but they also extend

146. See id. at 175.
147. See id. at 176.
148. See id. at 180.
149. See id.
150. Jacobs et al., supra note 1, at 689 (citing CIHR Guidelines for Health Research
Involving Aboriginal People, CANADIAN INSTS. OF HEALTH RESEARCH, http://www.cihrirsc.gc.ca/e/29134.html (last modified June 27, 2013)).
151. See id.
152. See Whitener, supra note 54, at 271.
153. Id. at 272.
154. Id.
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their research services, including IRBS, to Native American tribes. 155 The
Indian Health Service may be better equipped to understand indigenous
research concerns than many other government organizations, but they are
still not as close to the community issues as the community members
themselves.
In 1996, the Navajo Nation set up its own IRB, called the Navajo Nation
Human Research Review Board (NNHRRB). 156 The Board implemented a
twelve-step process that investigators must undergo, including community
participation, review of data before publication, disclosure of results to the
tribe, and granting of data possession to the tribe. 157 The Navajo have also
specified that they intend to retain jurisdiction over their own intellectual
property and any researchers within their borders. 158 No researcher is
permitted to begin working unless s/he has acknowledged that fact.159
The Cherokee Nation has also established an IRB, and other tribes have
taken similar measures. 160 Some tribes have also tried to regulate genetic
research on their own lands. 161 For example, the Hopi have a Cultural
Preservation Office, and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
enacted a Cultural Resource Protection Ordinance in 1995. 162
Community participation should include training indigenous peoples in
genetic research, not only to help with the research, but also to ensure that
they fully understand the science and why it is being performed in their
community. 163 This training will increase the effectiveness of all informed
consent measures and will foster a two-way street of communication
between science and culture. 164 In effect, indigenous researchers should
make sure that the research will benefit the indigenous community and
should explain to the community what the science and the data will mean
for them. 165
Of course, non-native scientists must participate in the two-way street as
well, and that requires some training on working with indigenous
155. See Jacobs et al., supra note 1, at 690.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Harry & Kanehe, supra note 112, at 45.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 52-53.
163. See Jacobs et al., supra note 1, at 690.
164. See id. at 692; see also McGregor, supra note 4, at 366 (discussing conducting
research in a way that “avoid[s] harms to the group” that is being researched).
165. See Jacobs et al., supra note 1, at 693.
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participants. Professor Bette Jacobs and her colleagues suggest five critical
areas that should be conveyed to researchers working with indigenous
participants: (1) accountability to the indigenous population, (2) allowing
the indigenous population to have control, (3) recognizing that the
indigenous population has an interest in the data and the genetic materials
used in the research, (4) encouraging indigenous community members to
participate as researchers themselves, and (5) remembering that this is
going to be a long-term cross-cultural relationship with people who have
the same right to self-determination as does anyone else. 166
(3) Data Repositories. Professor Whitener suggests that creating an
indigenous data repository will vest control over research samples in
indigenous peoples. 167 Such a repository will require that any data collected
would remain housed with the population who donated it, which will also
effectively restrict access to it. 168 Through such a repository, anyone who
wanted to gain access to the data contained within will have go to directly
to the indigenous community who hosts it for permission.
(4) Compliance. Researchers need to understand what compliance with
indigenous research codes and other requirements entails, and they need to
understand the consequences of a violation. Including a statement of
compliance in any research agreement may also provide contractual
remedies if deliberately structured to do so. A similar statement should be
included in any published works that are based on the research.169 That
statement will provide editors and the entire peer review process with a
standard for enforcement and will protect both research participants and
their communities. 170
In conclusion, these four recommendations are a summation of the most
workable recommendations from scholars in this area of research. In one
combined system, they provide a strong foundation for supplying
indigenous research participants with more control over their own genetic
materials. Additionally, they provide the beginnings of a new relationship
between researchers and indigenous research participants, one that will put
them on equal ground and mandate respectful treatment in all informed
consent agreements.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id.
See Whitener, supra note 54, at 273.
See id.
See Weijer & Anderson, supra note 1, at 197.
See id. at 197-98.
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VI. Conclusion
As genetic research gains importance and momentum, the role of
indigenous populations in that research will also rise. Until now, it has been
easy to operate in our traditional framework of research and informed
consent, and our case law has supported it. 171 This framework, however,
has been proven time and time again to be incompatible with many
indigenous peoples’ belief systems. 172 The Havasupai’s case illustrates the
failure of mainstream informed consent when applied to an indigenous
research population, and the general lack of case law indicates all too
clearly that recognition of the disparity in American jurisprudence is slow.
Havasupai also demonstrates the decline of recognition for Native
American tribal sovereignty and tribal rights. This is a state of affairs that
not only undermines a key principle of our jurisprudence regarding tribal
relations, but simultaneously defeats the purpose of bioethics and collapses
potentially beneficial research relationships—which, in the end, nullifies
any progress that could be made in genetic research involving these
indigenous populations.
The most effective way of redressing the problem is to invest indigenous
research populations with more control over their own genetic materials
through means such as indigenous research liaisons and indigenous
research codes. To do that, principles of tribal sovereignty must first be
renewed, followed, and respected. Genetic research has proven benefits, but
it will not progress with indigenous research participants if those
participants—and their way of life—are not treated with respect.

171. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990).
172. See discussion supra Part III.
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